# Holistic perspectives on safety of ADSs

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






# ADS safety – Lives at stake







#### **Outline**

- Setting the stage eight challenges
- Overview of categories of methods and techniques
  - Deep dive Scenario-based V&V
- Research gaps



[M. Gyllenhammar, G. R. de Campos, and M. Törngren. "The Road to Safe Automated Driving Systems: A Review of Methods Providing Safety Evidence". TBA]



#### Safety = Absence of unreasonable risk

$$R = E \cdot S$$

No standard yet → up to each OEM/company to decide


Society would not accept vastly different from human driving accidents.

~10<sup>-8</sup> fatalities per hour

[P. Junietz, et al. (2019). Macroscopic safety requirements for highly automated driving. Transportation research record.]

TABLE 1 Accidents on German controlled-access highways

| Severity        | ISO 26262 Severity level | Average distance between two accidents of this level | Accident rate per driven    |
|-----------------|--------------------------|--|-----------------------------|
| Fatal           | S3                       | $660 \cdot 10^6 \text{ km}$                          | $1.52 \cdot 10^{-9}$ /km    |
| Severe Injuries | S2                       | $53.2 \cdot 10^6 \mathrm{km}$                        | 1.88 10 %km                 |
| Injuries        | S1                       | $12.5 \cdot 10^6  \text{km}$                         | 8.00 · 10 <sup>-8</sup> /km |
| w/o Injuries    | S0                       | $7.5 \cdot 10^6 \mathrm{km}$                         | 1.33 · 10 <sup>-7</sup> /km |









Environmental uncertainties




Interaction uncertainties



#### ADS responsible for the entire driving task



**SAE J3016** 









Complex system of interwoven functions




Environmental uncertainties





### Complex system with interwoven functions





High dependability requirements




AI/ML-based components



Environmental uncertainties








#### Al-based components – issues

Interpretability – black box
Interpolatability – lack of generalisability
Robustness – adversarial attacks

[Goodfellow et al. (2015)]



"Panda"

Noise "Gibbon"



High dependability requirements




AI/ML-based components



Continuous deployment









# Crowdstrike incident – issue with release processes and QA





High dependability requirements




AI/ML-based components



Continuous deployment












## Methods span design, developent and operations



#### Assessment for scenario-based V&V



High dependability requirements




AI/ML-based components





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














# Holistic perspectives and collaboration towards safety





[M. Gyllenhammar, G. R. de Campos, and M. Törngren. "The Road to Safe Automated Driving Systems: A Review of Methods Providing Safety Evidence". TBA]

# Thanks for listening

**Magnus Gyllenhammar** 







# Methods span design, developent and operations

Safety

(case)

evidence

Operational design domain

HARA

Process-based arguments

Contract-based design

Supervisor architectures

Field operational tests

Extreme value theory

Scenario-based V&V

Formal methods

Design techniques

Verification and validation methods

Design time

Operational data collection

Runtime risk assessment

Threat assessment techniques

Out-of-distribution detection

Dynamic risk assessment

Runtime adaptation

Runtime (operations) Degradation strategies

Runtime certification

Dynamic safety mgmt.

Precautionary safety